Ramifications of Post Election Violence in Kenya and Beyond

The Ramifications of Post Election Violence in Kenya and Beyond

Paper presented to the 5^th Annual International Conference of Moi University

Theme: Research and Knowledge Dissemination towards the Building of

Healthy and Socio-economically Stable Nations.

By

Godwin Ong'anya

P.O. Box 3900 ELDORET

AUGUST 2009

 

The Ramifications of Post Election Violence in Kenya and Beyond

Abstract

Kenya is a regional powerhouse, with the most robust economy, society and politics. As an "Island of Peace" in a sea of chaos, Kenya's posture can be positively harnessed, to take a leading economic position not only in the region but in the whole continent. Kenya's historical background has given her a competitive advantage as an economic hub over other states in the East African region. The system of government in Kenya is characterised by rampant corruption and impunity. It has failed to account for the post election violence that took place in 2007. The system has not harnessed the coveted competitive advantage within the region, as it has fallen short of foreseeing the consequences of the coexistence within and without. Regionally the spill over effects of the violence were felt in land locked countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan who majorly rely on Kenya for their imports and exports. An excess of 1133 people died, hundreds of thousands condemned to internally displaced camps, property worth millions of dollars destroyed, transport system paralysed, hatred soured and the national economy almost crippled. Nationalism was swept under the carpet as many Kenyans were dispossessed of their land, making them squatters in their own country. This paper examines the ramifications of post election violence in Kenya and East African region at large.

Introduction

Kenya is an endowed country found on the East Coast of Africa. It is a democratic country, which became a state in 1895 under the British rule. Before that the inhabitants were living in traditional setups. The British came in and sought to divide the country for ease of administration. They colluded with some influential natives to help divide the people balkanising power. The colonialists came with the intention of helping themselves, not the natives. They had an agenda of exploiting the natives in the process of taking the minerals and the free labour available. They sub divided the most fertile land among themselves, mostly the white highlands.

In an effort to establish an efficient bureaucracy, they chose the system of dividing Africans on the basis of ethnicity. They identified collaborators to assist them in administration. These administrators were allowed to use corrupt means to enrich themselves (Maxon). They used to demand for handouts to give any service. This was a legacy the colonial masters were constructing, and which would remain a cancer in the flesh of local politics. Up to the time of independence, the society had been fragmented and disenfranchised. The black had been brainwashed to believe that whites are a superior race.

During this time, the natives were not identified as a race, but rather as a tribe. They were an inferior people who had to be civilised the western style. Hey had to behave like the whites, they had to abandon their cultural practices, they had to ape the westerners! The African mind therefore grew with this in mind: that they are an inferior creation, may be sons and daughters of a lesser God!

Independence and Post Independence Period

During the struggle for independence, Kenyans were demanding equal rights with the whites. They were demanding political, economic, and social rights to the same extend that they are enjoyed by the whites, including land rights. At independence, they were granted these rights. However, they had been brainwashed to believe in the superiority of the white race. The big man's syndrome had engulfed the African political elite, that they were at a cross roads on the form of government they cold resort to. Jomo Kenyatta insisted on a unitary government, with the opposite number Oginga Odinga insisting on a federal system. Finally, the Lancaster Constitution settled on the federal system, which was however later amended severally to strengthen a centralised system. Kenya slowly turned into a one-man arena, where the President held the monopoly of decision making. Dissenting voices were thoroughly crushed by the might of the state. Assassinations were an option whenever a politician becomes stubborn. The death of Tom Mboya 1969 for instance led to a terrible confrontation between the security forces and the citizens who were protesting on the government's insincerity concerning the death of the prominent politician. Eggs were pelted against the then President, a situation that led to a security hitch resulting in the death of several Kenyans. The message was however sent to the President.

Election time was a ratification process of the decision of the Party KANU. People were lining up to endorse candidates who had been cleared by the party. These were often party loyalists who did not hold political ambitions, but who seem promising on securing loyalty to the President.

The coming of the Moi Presidency in 1978 could not change much the political scenario. Mo inherited a spoilt political system of which he promised to perpetuate while in office. He liked the Swahili word 'nyayo' meaning footsteps. He vowed to fit in to the footsteps of the founder president, which he effectively did. He constructed the Nyayo House torture chambers to contain dissent. Nyayo House, built in 1983, had 12 torture chambers, where rogue politicians received their 'discipline' (Government of Kenya August 26, 2003, 57). The government task force recommended the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, contrary to the wish of the Government, which chose to ignore the Task Force's recommendation.

Elections became a formality, thus eroding the spirit of democracy. They were neither free nor fair. A one-party system was installed in Kenya, and entrenched in the Constitution. The political party machinery became so powerful that party officials often clashed with the civil service. The system became totalitarian, corruption rose, impunity entrenched, and the law was applied selectively. In 1991, there was real clamour for multipartism, and the President had to reconsider his policies. Pressure mounted from both within and without, and the donor community established a benchmark based on democratisation for any economic support. Structural adjustment programmes were implemented as a precondition for donor aid and loaning facilities. The Breton Wood institutions became so keen at pressuring the adherence of there conditions. Suffice to say, however, that the 'donors' were not necessarily donors but states and institutions striving for their economic goals and ambitions. They extended loaning facilities which could subject the developing world to a state of perpetual poverty. They aggravated the vicious cycle of poverty for their own strategic ends.

The 1992 general elections were credited for being relatively democratic, as opposed to previous elections. Different parties participated in the process, amid claims of vote rigging and gerrymandering. There was election related violence before and after elections where many Kenyans died with many others dispossessed of their property. The violence was ethnic in nature, following the ethnic composition of political parties.

The violence that was witnessed incidental to the 1992 and 1997 was just a build up to what would be the tragic violence of 2007. Commissions were set up to investigate the violence and recommend to the state for action, but the reports ended up in gathering dust. Pressure from outside was intensified, but fell on the government's deaf ears. The constitutional debates increased, with Kenyans demanding a new constitutional dispensation that would address the national power structure. It was intended to consider the land tenure system, which is among the worst nightmares in Kenya. The failure for Kenyans to get a new constitution may be said to be partly responsible for the post 2007 election violence.

Brief Background of Kenya's Politics and Society

Currently, Kenya has more than 100 registered political parties. These parties are not necessarily based on ideologies, but rather on personalities and ethnic groups. There is absolute freedom of movement from one party to another, often in search of some leadership position or appointment. The oldest party so far is KANU, which was so vibrant during the Moi presidency, but became redundant after the defeat of the party in the historic 2002 General elections. Many politicians in Kenya have a history of migration from party to party. The current Prime Minister, for instance, is on record as having moved from one party to another more than five times. To mention a few instances, he was in KANU initially because KANU was once the soul political party. During the clamour for multipartism, he joined FORD. At the split of this opposition party, he joined FORD-Kenya, and then defected to National Development Party in which he contested for presidency in 1997. He led this party to a merger the ruling Kenya African National Union up to 2002 when he sensed that the merger was not doing him good. He overtook the little known Liberal Democratic Party. To the LDP, he was accompanied by many other politicians from the political divide. The Liberal Democratic Party struck a deal with the National Alliance Party of Kenya under Wamalwa Kijana and Mwai Kibaki. This was a mega coalition Kenyans had ever witnessed, determined to bring to an end the 39 years of the KANU totalitarianism. As usual, ethnic sentiments were raised, that some communities were a target of the new found coalition. Specifically, the complaint was that the Kalenjin community was to pay fro the sins of the Moi presidency.

The above narration of the movements from party to party pauses the question of party discipline. As the Chairman of KANU, Moi ensured the implementation of party policies. Members had to tore the line or quit the party. Party discipline was commendable, as opposed to the party discipline now, when anybody in the party can speak in opposition to any other person on matters of the party. There is total loss of political responsibilities. This state of affairs has trivialised some very crucial agenda of the government.

Kenya's independence constitution provided for a federal system of government where the people had had a say in the running if government. Local governments were strengthened with a regional parliament. Parliament was bicameral, comprising of a Senate and a House of Representatives. This was felt by the political elites that it would divide the people of Kenya on ethnic lines. The constitutional amendments that were done were aimed mainly at strengthening the presidency. The first one in this regard was to scarp the office of Prime Minister, and instead merge the functions of Head of State and Head of Government in the office of the President. The holder of the presidency thus became all powerful, having the final say in all matters. The regional assemblies were disbanded, political freedoms reduced and the civil service became a carrot or stick for the president. He used appointments and disappointments to tame political dissent. This was the entrenchment of corruption, ineptness and impunity, which is a cancerous to the political system and society of Kenya.

2003 was a new dawn, so Kenyans thought. It was a time that all historical injustices could be addressed, and that Kenyans could have started on the right path of good governance. Kenyans hoped that life begins at forty, and so the new beginning had started. The president declared zero tolerance on corruption and poor governance, commissions were established to recommend on the way forward on past mistakes, and the international community expressed interest in economic assistance. The formation of the Task Force on Truth Justice and Reconciliation, and the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry were well received by the citizenry. The people hoped that Kenya was going to get an 180⁰ transformation. Hopes were so overwhelming that citizens took it upon themselves to arrest corrupt government officials. Little was it known that the government composed of strange bedfellows who got into a marriage of convenience to oust the 39 year rule of Kenya African National Union. There were no clear strategies for the way forward, as the beneficiaries of the loot were part and parcel of the new government. The Attorney General for instance had been accused of many omissions and commissions but was retained by the Kibaki regime.

The Run Up to the 2007 General Elections

The 2007 general election was the most hotly contested in Kenya's history. It may have been the first where Kenyans went to the elections bearing in mind the policies and principles of individual parties. It was a two horse race between the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and the opposition leader Raila Odinga. Both parties gave their campaign manifesto, with the incumbent publishing material on what the government had done so far. There were many intellectual exchanges than had ever been seen before in Kenya. Politicians were interviewed by the different media houses, giving the facts for or against a given party or personality. The level of democracy had grown so much that Kenya became a regional icon of political maturity. The media was operating freely, campaigns meetings done in civility, and generally people were satisfied with the level of political activity.

The main issues during the campaigns were the mode of distribution of state resources. The opposition camp claimed that the government was distributing the national cake in a grossly skewed manner. Kibaki, being a product he is of both the Moi and the Kenyatta's governments, has a choice of perpetrating the political and economic ills of his predecessors. Nangulu argues that Kibaki inherited the nepotism system from the Moi era. She notes that in the 1970's most senior positions of government were held by the Kikuyus, contributing to the high level corruption and mismanagement of the Kenyatta era (Nangulu 2007, 248). Newspaper articles were published to this effect, identifying the senior government appointments that were believed to be skewed towards the Kikuyus. Nangulu notes that since Kibaki helped bring the system of nepotism in place, he may not be expected to dismantle it. He therefore resorts to dishing state appointments to members of his Kikuyu ethnic group, and by extension the Merus (ibid). Generally, propaganda became the order of the campaigns, with the government spokesman coming to the defence of the government on skewed appointments.

The other issue was the level of corruption in government. The Moi regime had presided over a culture of corruption, nepotism and impunity through mega scandals like the Goldenberg, whose proceeds are said to have funded the 1992 General lections campaigns. The Commission that had been established by President Kibaki to inquire into the scandal submitted its final report. However, the recommendations were not honoured. Politicians started poking holes into the magnificent work of Justice Samuel Bosire who chaired the inquiry. As the head of state, the president failed to give direction on the saga. He was prevailed upon to suspend the implicated officials of his government, but he declined. This eroded public trust the citizenry had on him and thus provided a reason why his government should have been fixed.

Another shame for the Kibaki's first government was the Anglo Leasing scandal. This was a systematically conducted scandal, which was inherited from the Moi regime and perpetuated to the Kibaki regime. Kibaki's lieutenants forgot that his was a coalition government, and corruption cases may not be easily swept under the carpet. They went ahead in hiding the facts and making payments to non existent companies. The Governance and Ethics Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President John Githongo briefed the President on the affair that was going on, but the president chose to remain quiet, as usual. The big fish were let out of the net as the small fish were caught. The Vice President was not questioned, and so were the Finance and Internal Security ministers, who were adversely mentioned by the self exiled former Permanent Secretary.

A chain of many other scandals also rocked the unstable government of Mwai Kibaki. There was an irregular attempt at selling shares of the Safaricom Company Limited in an initial public offer. The matter was interpreted as a pure political act by the incumbent government to private all major state corporations for the benefit of the oligarchs.

The constitutional debate was another area of contention. The NARC presidential bid under Mwai Kibaki in 2002 had a well framed manifesto in which a new constitutional dispensation was to be realised within the first 100 days of NARC at the helm. This turned out to be yet another unfulfilled promise. Facilitation was however provided by the government leading to a showdown in which the cabinet was split between the supporters of the draft documents and the opponents. A deficiency of discipline within the government was clear as cabinet ministers contradicted each other in public rallies and other forums. They towed each other in public, thus creating an embarrassing situation before the citizenry. The president became helpless, and could not contain the cabinet. He came up clearly in defence of the document, exacerbating the already worse satiation. Ministers opposed to the constitution thus came in a direct confrontation with the President, in public. The days in the cabinet were indeed numbered, as they were to be relieved of their ministerial duties after the referendum.

Courtesy is a provision of a civilised society. A situation where the president insults the public at the glare of cameras is grossly odd. Kibaki is on record referring to his electorate as chicken droppings, foolish and useless. This is lack of decorum, and was among the reasons why the opposition felt the incumbent government had to be fixed.

The government had failed to deal with the Mungiki, a rowdy gang of youth who had taken over some bus terminal. They were demanding a fee for them to provide security and other social services. They had become a 'shadow government' demanding 'taxes' for the services they offered. Members of this gang come mainly from the Kikuyu community, and started of as a religious association. In fact, the name 'Mungiki' may be translated literally as 'fellowship.' This organised group has been used by politicians to further their political ends (Kenya 2008, 27). They are gang for hire to disrupt meetings of political opponents. By the failure of the government to tackle the unemployment issue, the Mungiki would continue being with the people and disturbing public order. The opposition had a marshal plan to tackle matters of unemployment and insecurity, a factor that was well debated during the campaigns. On the other hand, the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Mount Elgon District had been smoked from their hiding sanctuaries by the might of the Kenyan military force. The government was accused of high handedness in the operation that was marked by gross human rights violations against people who were merely protesting against the government's stand on the land tenure system. There are other instruments of violence that the government had not considered eliminating. This is because these instruments were probably used by some of the individuals in the corridors of power to get to where they are, leave alone their patrons and sponsors. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence cited some of them as Taliban, Chinkororo, Kamjeshi, Baghdad Boys and so on (ibid).

Inequitable distribution of infrastructure and other economic resources also had an impact in the election campaigns. The road network, for example, is relatively highly developed in Central, Nairobi and parts of the Rift Valley provinces. North Eastern Province has been systematically left out in the from the development programmes of the government. Kenyan citizens in the area feel themselves outside Kenya, because there is nothing they gain from the state. These are people who take care of their own security, and live a life which people in Kenya 'proper' may not think of. During the electioneering in 2007, the Orange Democratic Movement had a methodical programme of improving the living standards of the inhabitants of this vast province. In fact, the Orange Democratic Movement was accused of entering into a memorandum of understanding with the Moslems.

Several concerns on the associations of the political leaders were also an issue during the electioneering. The incumbent was accused of association with the business elites, and thus unapproachable to the common person on the ground. On the contrary, the Orange Democratic Movement candidate is well known as a seasoned mobilise who freely mingles with the people, telling them what they want to hear.

The Election and Aftermath

After recording the highest turn out of elections in Kenya's history, there were contradicting figures released to the public. Figures released at the polling stations differed sharply from what was released at the national tallying centre at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre. Kibaki's strongholds had delayed with the election results, prompting the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to issue threats through the media. He complained that the mobile calls to the officers concerned in the areas that delayed their transmission of results went unanswered. He built up suspicions and public emotions by saying, maybe with a light touch, that the people who are trying to doctor the results may find it difficult to succeed.

On the afternoon of 30 December 2007, the final election result was declared in favour of the incumbent, and the haphazardly organised swearing in ceremony conducted almost immediately, after the national flags had been lowered. It was this embarrassment of the year that gave Kenya a new historical event, which was to cost the lives of more than 1,000 people.

Both intermittent and planned violence flared with looting of both public and private property going on the rise. In Central Kenya, people went to ululations and celebrations, while in other areas fighting pitched up as Kenyans expressed dissatisfaction with the irregular swearing in of the incumbent: it was a time that the Electoral Commission of Kenya Chairman Samuel Kivuitu lost his respect world over, the respect he had built over all his professional life. He became a real disgrace to the Kenya people and an icon of shame and timidity. He was later asked by the media if he is sure that Kibaki won the elections, and surprisingly he said he does not know who won.

Only three countries congratulated the irregular results. These were the United States, which later retracted its congratulatory message; the United Arab Emirates; and the undemocratic Republic of Uganda (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2008, 54). The Commonwealth Observer Group and the European Union Observer Mission noted gross irregularities, and therefore did not approve the process.

Consequences

The destruction of public property and loss of human life was resorted as Kenyans were venting their anger the irregular declaration of Mwai Kibaki as the winner. The government went ahead gagging the media, as a way of cooling down the tempers. It was wrongly assumed that an uninformed public would be more peaceful. This gave rise to the use of alternative technology to spread information and misinformation, as there was no other way knowledge could have been disseminated. Kenya becomes the continent's laughing stalk, almost a wonder of the world that once an island of peace, then a unit of Africa's indiscipline politics. The most affected areas included the Rift Valley Province, and Nyanza Province. The irregularly declared president elect could not control the chaos. Matters went out of hand as roads were barricaded by rowdy youth across the country.

The violence turned ethnic in character as politician spearheaded the forceful eviction of some communities from some areas on the basis of ethnicity. Kenya became a disunited nation, where, initially, the Kikuyus became the target of ethnic violence. They were considered as the cause of the election malpractice, because Kibaki hails from the community. Kikuyus were therefore considered as enemies of democracy, stealing the presidency from Raila Odinga. As a result, Kikuyus in the North Rift town of Eldoret were attacked, in the Lake City of Kisumu they were victimised, and the general view was that Kikuyus had stolen the election. The situation may have been directed by the referendum of 2005 where Kikuyus voted in favour of the mutilated draft from Kenyans through the Bomas Conference. The Kikuyus supported the disfigured draft because they were tricked that by so doing they would be protecting 'their' being at the presidency (Ong'ayo 2008).

Loss of life

Many Kenyans lost their lives either directly or indirectly following the post 2007 election violence. According to the official figures released by the Commission of     Inquiry into the Post Election Violence, 1,133 people died directly as a consequence of the violence. The deaths were caused by various circumstances. The Commission of Inquiry gave a breakdown of the deaths, of which they reported is accurate. The summary per province indicates that the Rift Valley was the worst hit, accounting for 744 deaths. This was followed by Nyanza Province which recorded 134 deaths. Eastern and North Eastern provinces were spared the deaths, the way they are spared a share of the national cake in terms of state resources allocation. Uasin Gishu was the worst affected district with 230 deaths, followed by Nakuru with 213.

The causes of death were varied. Most of them however were caused by gunshot wounds, meaning that the police wee part of the problem. Gun shots account for 405 deaths, equivalent of 35.7% of the total deaths. It is recommended that the police be regulated in the manner they conduct their official duties.

Source: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence.

Injuries

Injuries were also inflicted during the violence, with the Commission analysing 3,561 of such. The causes of these injuries, just like the causes of deaths, are varied. Some were as a result of gun shots, sharp objects, traumatic circumcision, and so on. In this, the extend of the fratricidal blood letting may seem amazing. The Commission noted that of the total number, a massive 3,004 casualties were as a result of citizen against citizen. This seem to be a golden opportunity Kenyans got to sort themselves out, as issues of historical injustices have never found an opportunity to be addressed. The inquiries that were commissioned incidental to the post election violence came up with startling revelations, of which the citizens are keenly following. It begs the question of whether we need massive deaths before we can put our political and institutional houses in order. It is regrettable hat the violence happened, but it is encouraging that Kenyans are now aware that impunity is an adversary to justice and good governance in any democratic system.

Damage to Property

The perceived importance of human life makes it imperative to consider the scale of violence in terms of the number of human death. The holocaust was so devastating, and thus an emotive debate because of the number of deaths incidental to it. Damage to property comes second, and so we get the analysis of economic loss. Kenya lost property worth billions of shillings as a result of post election violence. Motor vehicles, farm products, shops, infrastructure, etc were razed down by rowdy citizens, who were crying for justice. They were right in what in what they were fighting for. The debate however is whether the political elite got the message right. If they did not, then they are indirectly inviting a worse scenario.

Destruction of property was not selective. Trees were cut down crops were destroyed, vehicles were burnt, houses were reduced to ashes, the road network was destroyed, and even the railway line was undone in some places. In Kipkelion for instance, the crop destruction was record breaking. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence puts figures at "36, 566 bags of maize, 8,100 bags of beans, 800 bags of Irish potatoes, 40 tones of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 hectares of sugarcane and 3,219 plants of coffee" (Kenya 2008, 337)

The analysis of the aftermath speaks volumes on the culture of impunity and the state of human rights in Kenya. Police may receive orders to shoot to kill. This may result in killing of innocent civilians, as it happened during the post election violence. Live bullets were meted against Kenyans who were demonstrating against a stolen election (if not stolen, then the irregular swearing in of the perceived winner of the election).

Lessons of the Violence to Kenya

The lesson Kenya learns is that no single community, however populous it may be, can lead the country. All the ethnic groups matter. It is evident that the post election violence started as a reaction to the Kikuyu dominance. The Kikuyus had argued that their massive numbers can produce a president. However, the unity that was witnessed by the other communities proved otherwise. Kikuyus became victims of ethnic dominance, as they were being attacked by almost all other ethnic groups.

On the entrenched culture of impunity, it came up clearly that historical injustices may not always be left unattended. The political elites who have ever been involved in malpractices be brought to justice after all. If the state institutions are not capable or willing to deal with human rights violations, the International Criminal Court at The Hague may come in handy as an option. Indeed, Justice Phillip Waki's Commission was well selected. It came up with recommendations that were not expected by the political elite. The recommendations were somehow self-implementing, with well indicated timelines. It is now upon the Kenyans to pressure the Government to implement the recommendations to end the culture of impunity.

Politicians have been using the extra-state security apparatus in meeting their political ends. There is need to address the root cause of these militant groups. To begin with, these are opportunistic jobless youth who use politics as a way of getting something for their stomachs. The government should address the problem of employment, to avail gainful job opportunities for the youth.

There should be equitable distribution of national resources so that no community may feel marginalised. North Eastern Kenya for instance is grossly marginalised, and this is systematic because the successive regimes have been doing the same thing

Effects of the Violence to the Neighbouring Countries

Kenya's port of Mombasa has a natural harbour which serves Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. During the violence, all these countries were affected by the transport problem of their property from the port of Mombasa. Road blocks were mounted by Kenyans thus affecting trade supplies to Uganda and Eastern Congo (Kenya 2008, 42). Oil supplies to Uganda and Tanzania was also disrupted as borders were guarded by armed youth. Specifically, goods destined for Uganda were targeted by the hungry Kenyans who were protesting the perceived interference from Uganda on Kenya's affairs. Word went round that President Museveni sent his military to Kenya to help the Kenya police. This was however dispelled as baseless. Instead, the CIPEV Report concluded that the said Ugandans were actually the Rapid Deployment Unit of Kenya.

The degeneration of Kenya could have obvious effects to the war torn Somali. This is a country that has never experienced peace since the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. The Al Qaeda terror network could set in to establish a launching ground in Kenya. This is because Kenya is the only country that has been keenly assisting the Transitional Federal Government, which is getting opposition from the Islamic Courts Union, among other organised groups.

The United States has also been actively involved in the progress of Somali, because of its declared war on terrorism. Strategically, Kenya is well placed to assist in the crusade. It did not come as a surprise for the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice emphasising 'real power sharing' when she visited Kenya during the violence. The African union also had to come in good time to save the face of the continent. The lesson that was learned was a bit discouraging, as Kenya's example was indicative that any country can be challenged when it comes to matters of democracy. It was a pointer to the totalitarians like Robert Mugabe and Muammar Gadhafi that democracy is not the best form of government. It gave Museveni confidence to learn that he is not an island in the region with regard to nondemocratic leadership.

The debate on the federation of East Africa may also borrow some lessons from the chaos. Kenya's expressed their distrust with Uganda. Kenya has ways and mans of influencing negatively the economy of her neighbours. Strategies have to be laid on how to militate against the likely freeze Kenya may impose against her neighbours.

Conclusion

The post 2007 election violence should be considered positively. It should not be regrettable, but be looked at as an opportunity for the political, social and economic system to be reconsidered. The problems that have bedevilled the country since independence should be addressed, and following the recommendations made by both the Commission f Inquiry into the Post Election Violence and the Independent Review Commission, which concentrated more on the security system, and the electoral body, among other institutions. Kenya needs a firm structural foundation, which may be considered through a new constitutional dispensation. There is need for a strong chief executive, whose authority is derived from the constitution. The current system of power sharing is not the best. The government is weak and ineffective. Parliament is slowly usurping the powers of the executive, thus creating conflicts in leadership. The land issue should be addressed, and the policy on nationalisation of land be debated. It is ironical for a Kenyan to be a squatter in his own country.

Presidential appointments should be vetted by parliament, to assure equitable representation.

 

Works Cited

Government of Kenya. Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Task Force, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, August 26, 2003, 170.

Kenya Human Rights Commission. Violating the Vote: A Report of the 2007 General Elections. Nairobi: Author, 2008, 60.

Kenya, Government of. Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence. Commission of Inquiry, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2008, 518.

Nangulu, Anne. "The State, Ethnicity and Resource Allocation for Socio-Economic Development in Kenya." Maarifa (School of Arts and Social Sciences) II, no. 2 (July 2007): 243-254.

Ong'ayo, Anthony Otieno. "The Post Election Violence in Kenya: An Overview of the Underlaying Factors." Pambazuka. February 14, 2008. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/46094 (accessed 2008).